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1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Following an uninspiring attempt at regional co-operation in the 1980s, 
Southern African states began in the 1990s to pursue economic 
tion with renewed vigour, with particular emphasis on building a 
integration agenda. This was primarily as a consequence of developments 
in Europe (notably the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht) and North 
America (the establishment of NAFTA between the USA, Canada and 
Mexico). More significantly however, political rapprochement in the 
Region had an even stronger influence. The emergence of a new and 
democratic South Africa in April 1994 and the potential resolution of 
regional conflicts in Angola and Mozambique lent urgency to the search in 
the Region for a new approach to integration. 
In anticipation of the new South Africa, the Region had begun in 1991, 
to seriously reconsider its strategies for closer economic co-operation, 
acknowledging the importance of conSOlidating efforts to integrate their 
economies.' As a consequence, the Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC) was established by Treaty in August 1992, succeeding the 
former Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC).· Not surprisingly, in August 1994, South Africa became the 
eleventh member and one year later, in August 1995; Mauritius joined as 
the twelfth member. In 1997, two new members were admitted - the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles thus bringing the mem-
bership to fourte'en states each notably at different levels of development. 
The SADC Treaty' as adopted in 1992, is a broad enabling document, and 
does not create specific obligations of an economic nature for member 
Thus in anticipation of SOlUh African membership. the Heads of State and Government of 
the former SADCC. meeting in Arusha in August 1991. decided to shift SADCCs focus 
away from the co-ordination of externally funded proJects. towards promoting economlC 
integration amongst the ten members. They expected South Africa to join as the eleventh 
member. See Waterhouse (1992) and Fauvet (1992). ANC Deputy President Walter Sisulu 
had pledged that a non-racial South Africa would not seek hegemony over the region, and 
endorsed the SADCC principles of "equity. imerdependence and mutual benefits". 
2 The latter was a loose agglomeration of states. held together by a non-binding declara-
tion of imem known as the "Lusaka Declaration". which had been adopted in 1980 
Member states of SADC at that stage included Angola. Botswana. Lesotho. Malawi. Mo-
zambique. Namibia, Swaziland. Tanzania. Zambia and Zimbabwe. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &DEVELOPMENT 
states. These are to be spelt out in a series of protocols of which several, 
including those on Transport, Energy, Water Resources and Trade. have 
thus far been concluded. For present purposes, the most significant of 
these is the Trade Protocol, adopted by member states at the August 1996 
SADC Summit in Maseru. The Protocol anticipates the establishment of a 
free trade area (FTA) eight years after entry into force. which will occur 
following ratification, by eight member states. Thus far only four member 
states have ratified, namely: Botswana, Mauritius, Tanzania and Zim-
babwe. It is anticipated that South Africa will ratify early in 1999. 
This attempt at regionalism should be examined against developments 
in the global economy, where multilateralism has seen the adoption in 
1994, of a rules-based trading system and witnessed the creation of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). to police trade diplomacy. 
2 THE WTO AND REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
The cornerstone of the WTO Regime, is Article I of the GATT, upon which 
each WTO Member extends most-Favoured-nation (MFN) treatment to all 
other WTO Member States which are party to the Agreement. MFN is 
synonymous with non-discrimination and equal access to the markets of 
WTO Members. 
The concept of reciprocity is likewise associated with the MFN principle, 
and is an integral component of the concept of non-discrimination. Al-
though not defined in the GATT Agreement, in Article XXVIIl bis it is 
clearly stated that negotiations on tariff reductions should be " ... on a 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis ... ". 
There is however, several exceptions to these basic commitments, in-
cluding the principles of O} "non-reciprocity", which applies in respect of 
developing country WTO Members' trade with developed countries; (ii) 
differential and more favourable treatment in the case of developing coun-
tries, and (iii) regional arrangements generally. Each of these is explained 
below. including their significance for developing countries as a whole. 
2.1 Non-reciprocity 
On 26 November J 964 a fundamental reform of the GATT legal frame-
work occurred with the adoption by the Contracting Parties of Part IV of 
the GATT, entitled "Trade and Development". It became effective on 27 
June 1966. Part IV added three articles to the GATT Agreement, namely 
Articles XXXVI, XXXVII and XXXVIII. The adoption of Part IV had impor-
tant legal and institutional consequences. It resulted in the first substan-
tive reform of a basic GATT principle that is, reciprocity of concessions, as 
under Article XXXVI:8, developing countries are relieved of this commit-
ment. (Trebilcock and Howse 1995:35)" Thus under this Article, developed 
4 Also of the old GATT. 










































THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE RELATIONS 
countries do not expect reciprocity for the commitments they make in 
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the 
trade of developing countries, An explanatory note to paragraph 8 states 
that developing countries should not have to make contributions which 
are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade 
needs, taking into consideration past trade developments, This principle 
of non-reciprocity applies not only to trade negotiations, but also to nego-
tiations under, for example, Article XVIII dealing with safeguard action for 
development purposes; Article XXVIlJ, dealing with modification and 
withdrawal of concessions in a schedule; or any other procedure under 
GATT, Because Part IV makes no reference at all to Article XXIV, it is 
argued that negotiations for a FTA are not included in this list. The two 
GATT Panels of 1993 and 1994 on the EU's banana regime supported this 
contention, maintaining that the requirements of Article XXIV were not 
modified by Part IV.' 
2.2 Differentiation 
In November 1979. GATT Contracting Parties adopted four Tokyo Round 
agreements of which the Agreement on "Differential and more-favourable 
treatment, reCiprocity and fuller participation of developing countries". 
contained the provisions which make up the "Enabling Clause".' Through 
the "Enabling Clause" a permanent legal basis was created for preferences 
in favour of developing countries or among them, making them an inte-
gral part of the GATT system. Thus paragraph I provides: 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement. con-
parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to de-
veloping countries. without according such treatment to other contracting 
parties" 
Paragraph 2 sets out the following areas of application: 
(al "Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties [Q 
products originating In developing countries in accordance with the GSP"; 
(bl "Differential and more-favourable treatment with respect to the provisions 
of the General Agreement concerning non-tariff measures governed by the 
provisions of Instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of 
the GATT"; 
(c) "Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed 
contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in 
accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the 
contracting for the mutual reduction or eliminatIOn or non-tariff 
measures on products imported from one another"; 
6 GATT Panel Report 1993: par 369 and GATT Panel Report 1994 par 159. This issue will 
be revisited below in sections 3 and 4. 
7 An important series of events helped to create the favourable conditions for this corning 
of minds, The period J 97 J to 1979 had brought with it economic disturbances 
and shifts in the relationship between developed and developing countries, 011 crises, 
economic decline. political tension in the UN and greater recognition of interdependen-
cies All of these events highlighted the urgency for faster economic development and 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVEWPMENT 
(d) "Special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries 
in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developmg 
countries" 
Paragraph 2 is not exhaustive, thus a note to the paragraph explains that 
Contracting Parties may examine any proposal for differential and more 
favourable treatment, In terms of paragraph 3, differential treatment is 
designed to promote the trade of developing countries without raising 
barriers to the trade of other member countries, and must not prevent the 
reduction and elimination of customs duties or other trade restrictions on 
an MFN basis, In addition, preferential treatment should be designed, and 
if necessary, modified to meet the needs of developing countries, [Long 
1987: 1 02] 
Even though the "Enabling Clause" provides a permanent legal basis for 
the granting of for developing countries, it does not define 
"developing" country sratus, nor does it say what countries qualify for 
such preferences, Under GATT practice, the system of self-selection ap-
plies, Thus, which countries fall within the category of eligible states, is an 
open question," 
The principal justification for granting preferences under the "Enabling 
Clause" is the contention that treating equally those states that are une-
qual would be unfair. Implicit in the heading "Differential and more 
favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation of developing 
countries", is the notion that developing countries would, with the contin-
ued and successful development of their economies, graduate to a more 
developed status. They would then be able to "participate more fully in 
the framework of rights and obligations under [he General Agreernenr",IO 
The notion of "fuller participation" by developing countries is the com-
plement of "differential and more favourable treatment", [Long 1 987: 1 02] 
It provides the basis for a potential reversal of the entitlement to differen-
tial and more favourable treatment, at least in respect of the more ad-
vanced countries. Thus as their situation improves "equality" of treatment 
should progressively become the rule, particularly in those sectors where 
they have become more competitive. Thus differential treatment should 
not be looked upon as being immutable, 
Because GATT embraces the tradition of self-selection in respect of "de, 
veloping" country status (a practice continued by the WTOl. this has given 
rise to enormous controversy over the issue of "graduation", Advanced 
developing countries such as Israel, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore, 
enjoy per capita GNPs, and yet are still categorised as "developing coun-
tries", Similar questions are also being raised about countries like for 
example Brazil, Chile and Malaysia. Unfortunately, the Uruguay Round 
Agreements (UR) failed to deal with this issue in a satisfactory manner, 
8 Olivier Long, former Director-General of GATT, contends that the list does nor cover 
'special' preferences such as those resulting from [he Lome Conventions, 
9 Long 1987: I 02 and see also Carl 1989, 










































THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE RELATIONS 
Instead, the UR Agreements have divided developing countries into two 
groups: the least-developed countries (LLDCs) and developing countries 
(LDCs). In some instances, a further distinction is created. Thus for exam-
ple, in relation to export subsidies, GATT 1994 creates a division between: 
(i) least-developed countries;" (ii) 20 developing countries whose per 
capita income is below US$ I ,ODD; and (iii) the rest of the developing 
countries. Zimbabwe is included in this group. 
The WTO Agreements draw this distinction between LLDCs and LDCs 
so as to limit in respect of the second group, the application of the princi-
ple "differential and more favourable treatment", making it time-bound 
and confined in its scope. For LLDCs, the rule has indefinite application." 
This attempt to divide developing countries in this artificial and arbi-
trary manner is unconvincing and creates an unfair discrimination against 
developing countries which while not classified as "least-developed" 
nevertheless are so poor as to require treatment which favours them over 
the advanced developing countries. 
The problem with this approach to differential treatment is that it is 
rooted in the discredited GATT practice of "self-selection".'1 It does not 
tackle the root of the problem, that is, how to deal with the advanced 
developing countries, which have graduated out of that status and there-
fore should by now be expected to adopt full reCiprocity in their relations 
with developed countries. 
Because of their inability to persuade these countries to adopt reciprocal 
MFN, the solution adopted has been to treat all developing countries that 
do not have a per capita GNP of under US$ 1,000 or are least-developed, as 
though they are "equal". This creates an absurdity since it places a coun-
try like Swaziland on an equal footing with a country like Singapore. 
I I Of the approximately 48 least-developed countries in the world, 38 are part ot tile ACP 
countries. 
12 Of course. the fact that the principle is available indefinitely for LLDCs does not mean 
that it is a rule created in perpetuity Rather, its indeterminate nature is recognition of 
the extremely desperate situation of these countries. However, there is an assumption. 
that. given the admittedly slow and perverse nature of attempts at development in 
least-developed countrIes. the latter will with time. eventually graduate from their unfor-
tunate status. When that the rule will fall into disuse and become redundant. 
as these States will then be to adopt reCiprocal MFN in respect of their trade rela-
tions With other WTO Member States. and be integrated into the global economy. This 
view is supported by the fact that the WTO Agreement states in Article XI:2 that LLDCs. 
recognised as such by the UN. will only be reqUired to undertake commitments and 
concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development. financial and 
trade needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities. In addition in the "De-
cision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries", adopted in the UR Fmal 
Act. the Ministers repeated the principles regarding commitments and concessions. and 
gave LLDCs until April 1995 to submit their Schedules. The fact that LLDCs, despite 
their preferential status. are still expected 10 "undertake commitments and conces-
sions", and were expected to submit schedules by April 1995, indicates that there is an 
assumptiOn that they will one day be able to reCiprocate fully on tariff concessions. 
McGovern 1995:9.21 ~ 1 to 9.21 
13 Within GATT and now WTO practice. countries deCide tor themselves whether or not 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Clearly this WTO practice on differentiation is in need of reform. A 
more credible approach would be to adopt criteria similar to that of the 
OECD DAC,I4 which would indicate more clearly the differences existing 
between countries purporting to be "developing" countries. Such criteria 
should be based on more than just developing country per capita GNP, 
although this last indicator is significant. Additional economic indicators, 
which determine a country's status, should be used such as for example, the 
relative role of agriculture and industry in the economy as well as that of the 
production structures. Other indicators that could be useful are levels of 
health, including life expectancy, literacy and education. 
Developing countries are clearly not on par inter se, whether economi-
cally, politically or otherwise. It is unjust to qualify the application of prefer-
ential treatment for the majority of developing countries merely to prevent 
the more advanced "developing" countries, which still insists on the classifi-
cation instead of graduating, from benefiting from such treatment. 
2.3 Developing country regional arrangements 
The WTO Regime provides three approaches for arriving at a regional trade 
arrangement. These are either: (i) Article XXIV of the GATT; (ii) paragraph 4 
(a) of the Enabling Clause and Part IV ("Trade and Development") of the 
GATT; or (iii) Article V of the General Agreement on '['rade in Services (GATS). 
For present purposes, only the first two procedures will be considered. 
Article XXIV provides the approach more suited for developed country 
WTO Members' trade arrangements (North-North) and those advanced 
developing countries arrangements (South-South), whose main objective, 
according to the Article, is to increase "freedom of trade" .(Article XXIV:4) 
Article XXIV can also be used in a North-South arrangement, which must 
be reciprocal in nature. (GATT Panel Report 1994: par 159) It is probable 
that any FTA concluded between for example, South Africa and the EU, 
will be notified under Article XXIV. 
But the fact that an arrangement is notified under Article XXIV does not 
prevent an element of asymmetry from being built into the relationship 
while it is still an "interim arrangement", provided a "plan and a sched-
ule" are filed with the WTO. Once a fully-fledged Article XXIV customs 
union (CU) or FTA is established, it can no longer be asymmetrical. Reci-
procity must be granted in full. (GATT Panel Report 1994: par 159) Finally, 
there is nothing to prevent the less-advanced developing countries and 
least-developed countries from entering into Article XXIV arrangements. 
This is not however, advised due to the pOSSibility of stricter rule confor-
mity obligations, which may not be in the interest, of especially the LLDCs, 
given their entitlement to "differential and more favourable treatment". 
14 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Deveiopmenr's Developmenr Assistance 










































THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND SOUTHERN AFRlCAN TRADE RELATIONS 
The Enabling Clause on the other hand, is designed principaJly to care 
for the needs of developing countries, as its main objective is to facilitate 
economic development rather than tariff liberalisation. Thus Lyn Mytelka 
(1973:236,240) has opined: 
"Among developing countries ... the motivation for integration and the Objec-
tive of integration is not more or less integration, but rather the realisation of 
economic goals. Integration in many developing areas of the world is, in fact, a 
paradigm for industrialisatIOn" 
Article XXIV envisages four types of regional arrangements, namely CUs, 
FTAs, and "interim arrangements", leading to a CU or a FTA. Paragraph 4 
sets out the characteristics of CUs and FT As as being " .. to facilitate 
trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the 
trade of other contracting parties with such territories". 
The legal requirements and attributes of each arrangement are contained 
in paragraph 8. For example CUs must meet three legal requirements: 
1) Duties and other restrictive trade regulations must be eliminated on "sub-
stantially all the trade" in the territories of the members;'" 
2) There must be a common external tanff (CETl. with no internal differen-
tials within CU members, and a common trade policy; 
3) Duties and restrictions on the trade of non-union WTO member~ must "not 
on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of 
the duties and regulations of commerce. . prior to the formation of such 
union" 
FTAs are simpler and more commonly in use. The PTA must eliminate 
duties "on substantially all the trade" between its members. Member 
states can maintain their external tariffs very much as they were before 
the PTA was formed. All that is required (Article XXIV: 5(b)) is that mem-
bers' duties and regulations of commerce should not" ... be higher or 
more restrictive than the corresponding" ones existing prior to the forma-
tion of the FT A. 
All FTAs provide for rules of origin. This ensures that goods do not slip 
in from outside through members with lower external barriers." However, 
Article XXIV per se, does not deal with rules of origin. 
Since CUs and PT As take a long time to establish, interim arrangements 
are necessary to avoid the economic disturbance caused by a rapid move 
to free trade among members. To prevent these agreements from being 
used as a pretext for introducing discriminatory preferences, they are 
required to include a "plan and a schedule" for the formation of the CU 
or FTA within a reasonable length of time. The UR Understanding on 
15 This rule is not absolute, there are exceptions. Thus members are free where necessary. to 
exercise their right to maintain trade restrictions under GATT Articles Xl (quantitative re-
strictions). XII (restrictions to safeguard balance of payments), XIll (non-discriminatory 
quantitative restrictions). XIV (exceptions to the rule of non-discrimination). XV (exchange 
arrangements) and XX (general exceptions to GATT obligations). 
16 See discussion in Kumar 1995: 3. 
17 Yeboah (1993) 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Article XXIV sets the period for establishment at 10 years, which can be 
extended given sufficient justification. 
Because paragraph 4 expressly refers to "constituent territories", a strict 
interpretation of the term, Article XXIV permits reference only to coun-
tries, or at least to contiguous customs regions. '9 Certainly, the drafters of 
the provision had in mind at the time, "territories" such as the Benelux 
countries. They did not envisage customs unions or FTAs being estab-
lished between two non-contiguous zones (eg EU and SADC) or between 
two continents (Europe and Africa). 
Within the WTO Regime, the Enabling Clause provides a more flexible 
regime for developing country trade blocks, which is more indulgent of 
developing country arrangements than Article XXIV would permit. In this 
context, the scope for developing countries to create an arrangement sui 
generis of an Article XXIV trade block, exists, provided of course that it 
does not prevent the reduction and elimination of customs duties or other 
trade restrictions on an MFN basis. 20 
Article XXIV sets out inadequate criteria for both CUs and FT As, and for 
this reason has come up for a great deal of criticism. Certainly, in view of 
the history of abuse regarding associations claiming to be Article XXIV 
arrangements, the Article has not achieved its purpose in providing con-
trol. At the top of the list of offenders has been the EU 21 There have been 
many calls for its reform to provide for more coherence and stricter guide-
lines. 
However, the criteria under the Enabling Clause are even less tangible, 
and certainly also in need of sharper definition. Indeed, in respect of CUs 
and FTAs, it has been said that, 
.. [i]n the international system there is no standard model for a trade block. 
There are no standard models for customs unions, or free trade agreements. 
Analysis must borrow and synthesise from the practice of existing trade 
blocks. "(Qureshi 1996 151-2) 
The Enabling Clause permits the actualisation of the principle, "differential 
and more favourable treatment" for developing countries. In support of 
this position, Sir Leon Brittan has, as recently as 10 January 1997, stated: 
"It is ... worth recalling that the EU encourages developing countries to use 
regional integration as part of their economic development process. Many of 
the agreements which result are notified under the "enabling clause", agreed as 
part of the Tokyo Round in 1979 to enable special and differential treatment 
(and more lenient application of GATT rules) to be applied to developing coun-
tries. This objective remains important for the EU. Ideally it should be possible 
to provide for clearer, stronger rules in respect of FT A's and other regional inte-
gration agreements affecting developed and more advanced "developing" 
countries (many of whom have per capita GOP equivalent to EU Member 
States), while at the same time providing for a genuine more relaxed regime 
applicable to developing countries." (Brittan 1 997) 
19 See on this point Long (1987) 
20 WTO Focus Newsletter No 8 January-February 1996. 










































THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE RELATIONS 
The call for clearer. stronger yet more flexible rules is appreciated, Cer-
tainly. both Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause need strengthening, 
Their context also needs to be expanded to deal with the realities of 
globalised trade between non-contiguous and unequal regions. which, 
irrespective of what Article XXIV defines as permissible, will in all prob-
ability still be established between developed and developing countries, 
3 SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE RELATIONS AND THE WTO 
The SADC region comprises fourteen countries at varying levels of devel-
opment. These from South Africa, which in GATT!WTO parlance is a 
"developed" economy. to Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, as least-developed 
economies, The rest are developing countries. These disparities in levels 
of development will impact on attempts at a regional level to create a 
GATT consistent regional trading block, They give rise to conflicting 
interests so that often the weakest amongst a group of states comes off 
second or even third best. This may happen irrespective of particular 
rights that may exist for the latter within international economic law and 
regardless of specific agreements that may be entered into to counter 
such events, 
McCarthy has argued that regional trade amongst a group of unequal 
states is unlikely to bring spectacular results, The trade patterns charac-
teristic of developing countries. consist mainly of the export of primary 
goods and the import of intermediate goods and final manufactured 
products, Intra-regional trade therefore tends to be limited, Without the 
presence of South Africa, this is certainly true for SADC, where, prior to 
the entry of that country, only 4 to 7 percent of total trade was conducted 
with member states, Orthodox theorists, says McCarthy, would hold that 
regional integration among developing countries is immateriaL Mytelka 
supports this view:'" 
"The real obstacle to intra-regional trade [is] not the presence of tariff 
barriers, , , but the structural conditions of third world economic systems, 
When integration is conceived, as it most often has been, as the 
liberalisation of trade by the creation of customs unions or common 
markets, gains from integration under existing conditions will take time, 
though sacrifices must often be made immediately," 
22 A classificarion which is not without its problems and indeed is, if anything, a misnomer. 
23 It is noted that while Zimbabwe is not considered a least-developed country, it is 
certainly considered a 'low income' economy with a per capita GNP of US$52Q, With 
the exception of Angola, this puts Zimbabwe in the same league as the other least-
developed economies (Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique. Tanzania and Zambia), 
While Angola is relatively under-developed and through decades of war. has become a 
country in sore need of reconstruction, because it has oil revenue and diamond wealth. 
it is considered a middle-income country with a per capita GNP of between US$696-
$8.625. (World Development Report 1995), 
24 1993' 27. 33. See also McCarthy 1994 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Thus in the SADC region. member state interests would be better 
served within a framework of co-operation allowing for more efficient and 
dynamic
26 
exploitation of regional comparative advantage. Economic co-
operation would enhance productivity by increasing competition within 
an enlarged market. The Southern African countries could thus benefit 
from an arrangement that allows them to improve efficiency over a range 
of goods and services in preparation to accessing international markets. 
The larger market is seen as an opportunity to stimulate industrial 
growth in an environment that is neither autarchic27 or free trade, but 
definitely protectionist. although the scope for industrialisation is ex-
tended beyond the limits set by the domestic market. 
Because the primary aim of integration among developing country 
members is regional industrialisation, the location of industry becomes 
crucial. McCarthy shows that regional integration effectively exposes the 
region to a problem usually experienced within domestic economies: the 
unequal distribution of economic activity and people in "economic 
space",28 resulting in polarised development. 
Governments participate in a regional integration scheme because they 
believe that their countries have something positive to gain. There is also 
a belief that integration should lead to balanced economic growth and 
development within the region. If countries were not able to share equally 
in the industrial wealth of the region, then they would expect to receive 
adequate financial compensation. The issue here would be who compen-
sates whom? And if compensation were the preferred mechanism for 
dealing with unequal development, how would such a compensatory 
arrangement be sustained? 
A member state's subjective assessment of the costs and benefits de-
rived from integration cannot be determined with any degree of cer-
tainty.2
0 
Such perceptions are further complicated by the tendency of 
26 Mistry PS comments that: "NO[ so long ago, comparative advantage was used to explain 
patterns of international trade and the success of some countries over others in the 
world markets. More often than not, such advantage was seen to accrue mainly to 
countries which had natural resources. particular qualities of human capital. a surplus of 
financial capital. and an advanced economic infrastructure by way of functioning mar-
kets and institutions. The notion of static comparative advantage based on these en-
dowments. has given way to a different notion of more rapidly shifting dynamic 
competitive advantage which is based less on factors of production as such, and more 
on the possession of: market share, global brands, sophisticated process and information 
technology capabilities .... the ability to access and interpret knowledge .... and the sys-
temic dexterity which requires considerable flexibility in labour and factor markets." 
27 That is economically self-sufficient. 
28 In this context. the SADC region comprises an "economic space". 
29 Indeed. Mistry contends that "there is an imbalance between the sophisticated quantita-
tive analysis which can be undertaken to assess the trade implications of RIAs (regional 
integration arrangements) and the less rigorous. almost elusive qualitative basis on 
which the case for assessing the non-trade effects of RIAs must rely. Developing a 
holistic methodology for assessing all the advantages of regionalism in general, or even 
of specific RIAs in particular is. of course, easier mooted than achieved. There is no ob-
vious precedent which suggests the viability of a single all-embracing approach to 
evaluating the costs and benefits of a phenomenon with multiple effects of a quite dif-










































THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE RELATIONS 
politicians and bureaucrats not to pay attention to economic considera-
tions but to let political expediency with narrow national interests, defined 
by pressure-groups within their territories, affect their decisions . 
. Given the importance of the distribution of costs and benefits, the force of 
perceptions in thIS respect. and the role of political expediency. . it is not sur-
prisIng that it has been claimed that the unequal distribution of costs and bene-
fits is the most important reason for the major conflicts experienced by 
developing countries participating in integration schemes and for the lImited 
success of integration efforts in the developing world, .. 3 
How then should trade relations in the SADC Region be addressed, given 
that seven of the members, namely Angola. Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. Lesotho, Malawi. Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are 
The positions of the other developing countries, whilst also germane, will 
not be expressly highlighted. Their situation is implicit in the discussion. 
As the weakest of the SADC membership, the least-developed states' 
special position warrants particular acknowledgement. The Protocol on 
Trade makes no allowances whatsoever, for the special and differential 
treatment of the least developed of its member states. Every state, no 
matter what its level of development, is treated exactly the same as the 
others, The absurdity of this siruation becomes clear when one juxta-
poses, for example, Mozambique or Malawi against the economies of 
either South Africa or Mauritius. 
The GATT legal system recognises least-developed countries as a special 
category of states, upon which minimal obligations are imposed. Thus, the 
various Agreements of the Uruguay Round enshrine the right of the least-
developed countries to differential and more favourable treatment, For 
example, the Agreement on Agriculture, in its Article 15 (Special and 
Differential Treatment) provides inter alia: 
'''I In keeping with the recognition that differential and more favourable 
treatment for developing country members IS an part of the nego-
tiations. special and differential treatment in respect commitments shall 
be provided as set out in the relevant provisions of this Agreement and 
embodied in the Schedules on concessions and commitments. 
2 Developmg country members shall have the flexibility to implement reduc-
tion commitments over a period of up to 10 years. Least-developed country 
members shall not be required to undertake reduction commitments ... " 
Similarly, the Agreement on the Application oj Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, in Article 10 (Special and Differential Treatment), requires that 
. in the preparation of sanitary and phytosanitary measures "Members shall 
take account of the special needs of developing country members, and in 
particular oj the least-developed country members"." 
30 See discussion in McCarthy 1994: 1 0-11 and Hazelwood 1979: 40 53-54. 
31 McCarthy 1994: 1 1. 
32 Of (he 48 LLDCs worldwide 33 are in Sub-Saharan Africa UNCTAD The Least Developed 
Countries 1996 
33 Emphasis added. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade provides in Article 12, for 
"Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members" and 
(in 12: I) states that "Members shall provide differential and more favour-
able treatment to developing country members to this Agreement.. " 
In Article 12:4 it provides that, 
Members recognise that, although international standards, guides or rec-
ommendations may exist, in their particular technological and socio-economic 
conditions, developing country members adopt certain technical regulations, 
standards or conformity assessment procedures aimed at preserving indige-
nous technology and production methods and processes compatible with their 
development needs. Members therefore recognise that developing country 
members should not be expected to use international standards as a basis for 
their technical regulations or standards, including test methods, which are not 
appropriate to their development, financial and trade needs" 
As a last example, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which aims to 
integrate the sector'S into GATT, provides in Article 6 for transitional 
safeguard measures. In paragraph 6 of the same, it declares, .. .. least-
developed country members shall be accorded treatment Significantly more 
Javourable than that provided to the other groups oj members, , , preJerably 
in all its elements, but at least, on overall terms". 3, 
A glance at the Trade Protocol shows however, that none of these "enti-
tlements" have been recognised for the least developed of the SADC 
states, let alone for the others. 
What becomes even more absurd is the obvious treatment of these 
countries as being on par with an economy the size of South Africa. In 
global terms, the South African economy is minuscule when compared for 
example to a tiny country like Belgium. However, in the African context, 
and indeed, in the SA DC region, it is an economic giant. 
Within the WTO, South Africa is a developed economy." If develop-
ment is measured by the level of modernisation in an economy, then, by 
African standards, South Africa is certainly "developed"." It has a GNP of 
US$ 130,2 billion,3
D 
which is clearly four times larger than the GNP of 
35 By phasing out the \.1ulti-Fibre Agreement (MFA) 
36 Emphasis added. 
37 While this classification is considered a misnomer. at least in a relative sense, given 
the dualistic nature of South Africa's economy, the issue will not be discussed here as 
it is not entirely relevant to the focus of this paper. According to Mistry. the developed 
part of South Africa. compriSing approximately 6 million people, has a per capita GNP 
of about US$ 15,000. while the developing part of South Africa - which comprises the 
majority of approximately 38 million people - have a per capita GNP of around US$600. 
38 In the Southern African region, it accounted in 1985 (which is the latest date available 
for such comparison) for 78 percent of all motor vehicles. This amounts to some 40 
percent of those in Africa. Sixty-three percent of all tarred roads; 56 percent of all rail 
lines: 55 percent of maize production; 86 percent of all wheat grown; 75 percent of to-
tal exports and 68 percent of rotal imports. (Mills and Baynham 1994: 10). 
39 Source, World Bank. 1998/9. However, in order [0 obtain a proper perspective in global 
terms, of the relatively small size of some African economies including South Africa's. 
contrast South African GNP with the GNP of a small country like Belgium, which is in 










































THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE RELATIONS 
Nigeria, the second largest Sub-Saharan economy:o By contrast, the 
second largest economy in the sub-region, and South Africa's 
(non-SACUl trade partner, is Zimbabwe - with a GNP of US$8,6 billion 4 ! 
Compared to the other countries in SADC, South Africa has a large and 
relatively sophisticated manufacturing sector. 
190.0 
Mozambi ue 5,4 187,6 8,8 118,7 
N 215.2 794,7 
Swaziland 268,8 624,0 288,9 725,7 
Tanzania 0,6 0,7 
Zambia 2,3 ,8 152,2 4,6 160,8 
Zimbabwe 129.7 342,1 139,4 546.0 267,4 
Source, SADC 1996 
The region alone accounts for some 70 percent of South Africa's total 
exports to the continent, and approximately 20 percent of global exports, 
Indeed, manufactured exports to Southern Africa surpass those to the rest 
of the world, Currently, South Africa exports eight times more products to 
SADC countries than it imports from the region,'2 While SADC is consid-
ered to be extremely important for South Africa's trade in manufactured 
products, it is however, widely acknowledged that this type of trade 
pattern is unsustainable. It results in one-way trade and amounts to trade 
in a static market. South Africa could end up impoverishing her neigh-
bours if the trade imbalance is not substantially rectified or offset by 
compensatory investment inducing capital flows in the oppOSite direction. 
Such a situation is obviously not in South Africa's nor the region's long-
term interests. Most significantly, South Africa could contribute to de-
industrialisation in the SADC Region." 
40 GNP at 1994 figures is US$30 billion. South Africa's GNP in 1994 was 
125.2 billion Ibid. 
41 Ibid, South Africa's GNP is nearly five times larger than the combined GNP of the other 
eleven SADC member states. 
42 Based upon statistics provided by the South African Department of Trade and Industry, 
43 A static analYSIS carried out by the Industrial Development CorporatiOn of South Africa 
had indicated that a FTA would have immediate economic benefits for South Africa but 
would result in de·industrialisation in the rest of the SADC region. By that stage. it was 
already evident that some countries in the region, notably Malawi, Zambia and Zim· 
babwe, were experiencing stagnation in industrial output and exports. very little by way 
of diversification and a significant amount of dislocation and de-industrialisation, Under 
structural adjustment and within the confines of the Cross·Border Initiative «(BI), "CBI" 
is an initiative co-sponsored by the World Bank. lMF, European Union and (he African 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
Recognising this danger, the South African government has always 
taken the view that a trade regime in Southern Africa that permits asym-
metrical access should be established as a first stage in a process, which 
would eventually lead to a free trade area for SADC This means that 
South Africa would need to lower its tariff regime towards its SADC part-
ners at a faster rate than they would vis-a-vis South Africa. This position 
was, however, strongly opposed by the other member states, which 
preferred to insist on a strict adherence to the sovereignty principle, 
entailing the equal treatment of member states. The details of the negotia-
tions around this is.sue will not be covered here, except to say that they 
are discussed in another paper.(Thomas 1994) 
In January J 996, the sector met during the Annual Consultative Confer-
ence in South Africa, and since bilateral trade tensions were already at 
there highest levels," decided to create a Trade Negotiating Forum (TNF) 
to deal with both regional and bilateral negotiations. 
In May 1996, the TNF met for the first time in Dar Es Salaam, both to 
consider its own terms of reference and the revised draft agreemenL 
Facing a tight schedule and unfinished business, the TNF met again in 
Pretoria, in June 1996. It was evident at that meeting that considerable 
differences still existed on the revised Protocol. A further meeting took 
place in Dar Es Salaam on 8 August 1996. At this meeting, the parties 
reached agreement on: 
(i) the time frame for the FTA, which was set at years; 
(ii) the domestic content for the Rules of Origin, 
valorem, applying on a cumulative basis;4, 
set at 35 percent ad 
(iii) a one-year time limit to arrive at proposals on sensitive items, espe-
cially textiles and agricultural products. 
Described as a "framework agreement", the Protocol as amended was 
adopted by Heads of State at the SADC Summit in Maseru during their 
meeting in August 1996. 
Talks have been underway now for the better part of two years to bring 
the protocol into implementation. Until there is clarity on the table as to 
what detailed commitments are to be made, however, South Africa has 
been unable to ratify the protocol. This has contributed to stalling the 
process. However, what is notable about the Trade Protocol, is that in 
Development Bank. The European Commission has argued that this initiative results 
from "the desire to formulate a pragmatic way to promote more effective regional inte-
gration" in Eastern and Southern Africa. (Kennes 1994). 
44 South Africa was experiencing pressures from both Zambia and Zimbabwe over 
bilateral trade negotiations 
45 Ministers had indicated in January that they wanted at their next meeting, scheduled for 
July. to consider final proposals for a SADC Trade Protocol for submission to the August 
1996Summi!. 
46 Cumularion here would be applied on the same principles as it applied within the Lome 
relatlonship with the EU. in the sense that inputs originating from within the SA DC re-
gion would be calculated as comprising part of the 35 percent domestic content The 
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interpreting the detail into binding tariff concessions, the South African 
position on asymmetry is prevailing. 
What is not certain however, is to what extent the negotiators in the 
TNF are mindful of the needs of the least-developed states amongst them. 
Of these, two are currently not party to the talks for obvious political 
reasons. These are Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
However, the question arises whether the negotiators are taking on board 
the very real concerns over Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia. 
From the discussions gleaned from newspaper articles on the process:? it 
is clear that the major focus is on tariff reductions, This indicates that 
SADC states are in the first place, focusing ill-advisedly on trade liberalisa-
tion rather than on policies to help build their capacity for dealing with 
globalisation and the consequent marginaIisation of their economies, 
The impression emerges that no consideration at all is being given to in 
particular, LLDC entitlement to "differential and favourable treatment" in 
their trade relations with other WTO Member States, Certainly, since it is 
party to the SACU Treaty and therefore ostensibly a South African offer. 
amounting to a Lesotho offer, Lesotho's interests as an LLDC have been 
subsumed under those of the rest of SACU, The issue then is, should there 
not be some consideration of compensation for these countries, since by 
joining this regional arrangement. they are foregoing whatever entitle-
ments they might have under the Uruguay Round Agreements? 
Reverting to the focus on tariffs and sensitive products. the fundamen-
tal issue is that the Protocol typically. focuses too much on tariff barriers 
to trade in SADC when these are not the primary obstacles to more inten-
sive economic interaction in the region, There are two reasons for this, 
First, the existing schedule of tariffs applies in theory but not in practice. 
The diFference between tariffs that are supposed to be levied and those 
actually collected is enormous, largely because of the lack of effective 
administration of customs at border posts This is, inter alia. due to 
endemic misrepresentation and miss-classification of goods in bills of 
lading for imports·' 
Second. tariffs have not been important for all the reasons given in the 
African Development Bank Report on Southern Africa 50 The Report points 
out that NTBs are more problematic than tariffs, What the Protocol should 
have aimed at in practical terms is the issue of countervailing investment, 
and particularly trade-related-investment from South Africa into the other 
economies of the region. in amounts which would approximate the mas-
sive trade surpluses in favour of South Africa from intra-regional trade, 
The reality, which the Protocol should have addressed, is that the size of 
South Africa's trade surplus vis-a-vis the rest of the region is so large as to 
be unsustainable and un-financeable when it comes out into the open, 
47 See for example Dludlu 1998, 
48 This includes South Africa, 
49 For example. in Zambia, heavy-dury vehicles attract lower duties than passenger 
vehicles, An importer will then describe 25 passenger vehicles as 10 trucks, 











































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
With most SADC economies being as dependent as they are on foreign 
aid, it would be unrealistic to expect donors to keep providing extraordi-
nary levels of balance of payments support simply to finance imports 
from South Africa. The reason why the Protocol should have focused 
much more on investment measures, is that in the absence of inductive 
capital flows from South Africa, it is extremely unlikely that private capital 
flows from the rest of the world will materialise. 
The bottom line is that the Protocol, as it has been developed, and the 
tariff reductions, as they are being negotiated, are likely to exacerbate 
inequalities rather than redress the same. This reality has not been care-
fully thought through and mitigated against. 
As a final point, the fact that the Protocol will, when it comes into force, 
probably be notified by the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Arrange-
ments as an Article XXIV arrangement, as further indication of the failure 
of the SADC Region to give real meaning to the concept of "differential 
and more favourable treatment". 
Given the nature of the Region, and the profile of the Member States, 
the fact that little serious discussion is been given to the importance of 
testing the application of the Enabling Clause to this regional trade ar-
rangement is telling.'] 
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